
The Intellectual and Leadership Center of the Air Force







Center for Operational Analysis

We make a difference...

Lt Col Stephen Chambal, PhD Dr. Jeffery Cochran, AFIT/ENS

one student at a time







- Develop America's Airmen Today ... for Tomorrow
- Center for Operational Analysis
- Decision Analysis in the Department of Defense
- Brief look at Value Focused Thinking
- Defense Examples
 - JIEDDO
 - HLS
 - EOD
 - NRO
- Q&A





Develop America's Airmen Today ... for Tomorrow

Vision

To be operationally relevant by providing conduit for leading edge research which directly impacts the Air Force, DoD, and the National Security Structure of the United States

Mission

Build truly collaborative relationships with operational sponsors to achieve the Center Vision and support the Center Goals



Decision Analysis



Develop America's Airmen Today ... for Tomorrow

- Budget and prioritization
 - "Rack and Stack"
 - At all levels from unit to DoD
 - Number one use
 - Justification and defense
- Portfolio Management
 - Project funding, prioritization, and management
 - Multiple on ramps/off ramps, integration across acquisition
- Risk and uncertainty
 - Understanding impacts on operations, programming, and budget implications




Versions of VFT




Develop America's Airmen Today ... for Tomorrow


- Value focused thinking
 - Wide spread use across the AF and DoD
 - Implemented with various success
 - Driven by changes in requirements process
 - Capability based acquisition process
- Air Force Analysis Capabilities
 - Scientific analytical community
 - At all levels advanced education Air Force Institute of Technology
 - Organic within A9 structure
 - Supported via defense contracting




Ask not what your alternatives can do for you, but ask first what you want from your alternatives.

Air University: The Intellectual and Leadership Center of the Air Force Integrity - Service - Excellence









Decision Analysis



- Develop America's Airmen Today ... for Tomorrow
- Department of Defense Examples
- JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization
 - More detailed briefing tomorrow with Dr. Jeff Weir
- HLS Homeland Security
 - AFIT sponsored research
- EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
 - JSEOD Capability Based Value Modeling
- NRO National Reconnaissance Office
 - Briefed at the Director CIA/Congressional level

DEVELOPING A DECISION ANALYSIS MODEL FOR JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION (JIEDDO) PROPOSAL SELECTION



Maj Lyle Dawley Maj Lenore Marentette Capt Marie Long

2 June 2008

IEDs



- Primary source of US and coalition casualties
- Wide variety of devices
 - Fuse, explosive fill, detonator and power supply, and a container
- Generally difficult to detect and protect against

JIEDDO Background



JIEDDO Mission


To focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DoD actions in support of COCOMs and their respective JTFs' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.

- DODD 2000.19E

JIEDDO's Process



- Joint IED Defeat Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)
- Broad Area Announcement (BAA)
- BAA Information Delivery System (BIDS)
- Extremely large budget (\$4.37B)
- Enables **traceable**, **repeatable**, and **defensible** selection decisions



Conclusions



- Decision model closely matches current selection decisions
- Portable for use in later stages of JCAAMP process
- Provides traceable, repeatable and defensible scoring of competing JIEDDO proposals to aid decision process

Air Education and Training Command

Replenishing the Combat Capability of America's Air Force



Modeling Homeland Security: A Value Focused Thinking Approach

Pruitt, Chambal, Deckro

U.S. AIR FORCE


Integrity - Service - Excellence



Problem Statement



 Provide Federal level homeland security decision-makers with a decision support structure to leverage in the development and evaluation of alternative homeland security strategies.







- Homeland security decision-makers must balance security, resource costs, and civil liberties
- This study accounts for these tradeoffs through the utilization of three distinct value hierarchies
 - Security
 - Resource Costs
 - Civil Liberties



Security Hierarchy











Civil Liberties Hierarchy













- Homeland security will remain of imminent concern
- Value hierarchies provide insight to the development of effective strategy
- Provides a foundation for the Federal government to leverage in efforts to secure the homeland



MTAB Role in Establishing Requirements Using CBVM





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Weighted Hierarchy

EOD AMA Matrix			Operational Tasks							
			Detect/ Locate Access		Render Safe/DiagnoseNeutralize		Recover	Exploit	Dispose	
	5	Buried Munitions	25	5	30	25	5	N⁄A	10	
SI	22	Surface Munitions	14	16	30	25	4	4	7	
l Areas	15	Underwater Munitions	30	15	15	25	10	N⁄A	5	
Functional	30	IEDs	15	20	27	23	5	9	1	
Fune	14	Chemical Munitions/WMD	15	20	27	23	5	10	NA	
	3	Biological Munitions/WMD	15	20	27	23	5	10	NA	
	11	Nuclear Munitions/WMD	15	20	27	23	5	10	NA	





Prioritized Capabilities (Top 10)

Rank	Functional Area	Operational Task	Global Weight	Cumulative Weight	
1	IEDs	Diagnose	8.10	8.10	
2	IEDs	Render Safe/Neutralize	6.90	15.00	
3	Surface Munitions	Diagnose	6.60	21.60	
4	IEDs	Access	6.00	27.60	
5	Surface Munitions	Render Safe/Neutralize	5.50	33.10	
6	Underwater Munitions	Detect/Locate	4.50	37.60	
7	IEDs	Detect/Locate	4.50	42.10	
8	Chemical Munitions	Diagnose	3.78	45.88	
9	Underwater Munitions	Render Safe/Neutralize	3.75	49.63	
10	Surface Munitions	Access	3.52	53.15	





Metric & Value Function

Valua F

	Value	
Fu	Inctions	Detect/Locate Buried Munitions
J u p "Sv	Level 1 (0)	Cannot detect, in any physical environment, metallic or non-metallic buried munitions
	Level 2 (5)	Can detect, in good physical conditions, minimal metallic munitions up to 1ft deep
	evel 3 (20)	Can detect, in good physical conditions, some metallic munitions up to 1ft deep and minimal up to 3 ft deep
	Level 4 (40)	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 1ft deep, some up to 3 ft deep, and minimal up to 6 ft deep
	Level 5 (70) veet spot"	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 3 ft deep, some up to 6 ft deep, minimal up to 10 ft deep, and <u>minimal non-</u> metallic up to 1 ft deep
	Level 6 (85)	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 6 ft deep, some up to 10 ft deep, minimal up to 25 ft deep, and some non-metallic up to 1 ft deep and minimal up to 3 ft deep
	Level 7 (100)	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 10 ft deep, some up to 25 ft deep, minimal greater than 25 ft deep, and most non-metallic up to 1 ft deep, some up to 3 ft deep, and minimal up to 6 ft deep



Scoring Capabilities⁵ Worksheet

Buried Munitions:

Detect/Locate: There is not a requirement to go beyond 25 ft Minimal - Less than 50%, Some - Between 50% and 75%, Most - More than 75% Good physical conditions - Low level of obscurants, good visibility, fair to good soil conditions, no NBC hazards

Level 1	Cannot detect, in any physical environment, metallic or non-metallic buried munitions
Level 2	Can detect, in good physical conditions, minimal metallic munitions up to 1ft deep
Level 3	Can detect, in good physical conditions, some metallic munitions up to 1ft deep and minimal up to 3 ft deep
Level 4	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 1ft deep, some up to 3 ft deep, and minimal up to 6 ft deep
Level 5	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 3 ft deep, some up to 6 ft deep, minimal up to 10 ft deep, and minimal non-metallic up to 1 ft deep
Level 6	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 6 ft deep, some up to 10 ft deep, minimal up to 25 ft deep, and some non-metallic up to 1 ft deep and minimal up to 3 ft deep
Level 7	Can detect, in good physical conditions, most metallic munitions up to 10 ft deep, some up to 25 ft deep, minimal greater than 25 ft deep, and most non-metallic up to 1 ft deep, some up to 3 ft deep, and minimal up to 6 ft deep

Capability Levels

Current

1-yr

3-yr

5-yr

Justification for capability scoring for family of systems for JEOD community.



UNCLASSIFIED



Final Recommendations

- Approach to Augment Current AMA Process
 - Use CBVM to determine capabilities gaps/shortfall prioritization for resource allocation
 - Evaluate progress towards closing capability gaps
- Review mission area ranking
- Review EOD Capability Information
 - Current, 1yr, 3yr, 5yr by mission area
- Identify impact on prioritized capability gaps
 - Input new scoring data based on proposed initiatives
- Identify impact to changes in budget allocation
- Evaluate 5-year roadmap based on impacting/reducing high-priority capability gaps





Implementation

- Institutionalize CBVM into processes
 - Update weighting and scoring periodically
 - Continue to improve metric definition
- Standardized terminology/support structure
 - Maintain FA/OT definition and structure
 - Ensure consistent higher-level groupings across JEOD community
- Linking across all program areas
 - Create database for all ongoing notional concepts
 - Maintain info on initiatives being funded externally
 - Single source for info regarding capabilities, research and development, and acquisition







Investing in the Future

Using Decision Analysis to Simplify the Complex Evaluation of Future Space Systems



Problem



- Develop a first-class NRO <u>architecture vision</u> and <u>investment strategy</u> that best satisfies user needs across the Intelligence Community and National Security space domain.
- Provide the NRO a <u>defensible</u> and <u>repeatable</u> investment planning <u>process</u> to produce Planning, Programming and Budgeting recommendations traceable to User Needs and Strategic Guidance.



Intelligence Value Hierarchy



Overall NRO Benefit

Intel Value



What Intelligence Problems should drive future architectures?

Intel Problems



What are the driving information needs for each problem?

Core Information Needs



Critical Capabilities


Value

5

4

3

2



What kinds of capabilities are required in each discipline?


How well does the architecture provide the critical capabilities?



Top Level Guidance



- National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) – 26
- List of 30 Intelligence Topics of interest to the U.S.
 - Divided in to 3 bands of differing priority
- Covers a wide range of intelligence subjects important to U.S. efforts against terrorism, weapons proliferation, military aggression, international crime and human rights abuse.
- Incorporates insight from Defense Planning Guide and DCI Guidance





Core Information Needs



Critical Capabilities



User Requirements



Overall NRO Benefit

Intel Value



Intel Problems

Core Information Needs




Critical Capabilities



CORE INFORMATION NEEDS







Top Level Value Hierarchy



Overall NRO Benefit


Intel Value



Intel Problems



Core Information Needs





Identifies Critical Capabilities required to attain Core Information Needs (CINs). Assigns a 7 level scale for measuring level of achievement. Then assigns a value to each level of achievement.

Critical Capability	Definition	Level Value Metric	1 0	2 10	3 25	4 50	5 75	6 90	7 100
Resolution	The ability of an optical sensor to discriminate objects or features of increasing smaller dimensions.	Metric	1000sq Meters	500sq Meters	100sq Meters	50sq Meters	25sq Meters	10sq Meters	l sq Meters

This is the final step that transforms a large, complex, often subjective decision into a precise, simple, objective decision.




Approving Chain



- SEP System Evaluation Panel
 - Mid-level managers with subject matter expertise. Develop and review benefit scores.
- JSET Joint System Engineering Team
 - Chief System Engineer from each Directorate. Integrate cost and benefit to produce recommendations (prioritized spending plan) to leadership.
- Change Gang Directorate Chiefs
 - Review recommendations and make any adjustments for national or IC priorities not captured by process.
- DNRO Director NRO Final Approval










Evaluating Alternatives





ear form Portfolio Option#1 Portfolio Option#2 Portfolio Option#3 Form Capabilities





Order of Buy

- 0. Fact of life, must pay items
- 1. Program 1
- 2. Program 2
- 3. Program 3
- 4. Program 4
- 5. Program 5
- 6. Program 6
- 7. Program 7
- 8. Program 8

Above Guidance

- 9. Program 9
- 10. Program 10
- 11. Program 11



Bottom Line



- The NRO uses <u>value focused thinking</u> and <u>decision</u> <u>analysis</u> as the foundation of its investment and architecture planning process. This ensures a:
 - Coherent, close link between the NRO vision, Executive Guidance and User needs
 - Capabilities-driven, transparent, objective, decision process
 - Defendable budget with clear links between spending and architecture capabilities
 - Clear budget priority for funding decisions
- DDSE <u>facilitates</u> NRO Planning by:
 - Providing the analytical expertise for VFT and DA
 - Organizing the inter-office work and communication