

## Oil & Gas Appraisal and VOI

How the Game Changes Things

Presented to:

DAAG

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## **Agenda**

- DA and VOI
- VOI with a game-theoretic lens
- Lessons to take with you



### **Received Wisdom**

- Decision analysis teaches us that the value of information (VOI) is either positive or has no value
- While the costs to obtain information may exceed the value to be gained, the value of the information itself is always nonnegative
- The only debate is around how best to calculate the costs and benefits of seeking information

# The received wisdom is wrong and can be dangerously misleading



### Case example


#### **Situation**

- Upstream oil & gas case involving Nash Oil Company
- Nash is considering whether to drill a second exploratory well in a block it owns
- The Nash team does a traditional VOI analysis to figure out whether it is worthwhile

#### **Assessments**

- Base value for development without second exploratory well = \$300 MM
- Well cost is \$50 MM
- If positive results, new development plan would result in \$500 MM of additional value
- The Nash team sees the well as having a 25% chance of success

#### The decision tree



Expected value of drilling is .25\*750 + .75\*250 = 375


This is greater than the 300 from not drilling, so standard VOI analysis tells Nash to drill



### But, there is a "game" going on...

- Collaboration potential:
  - Kahuna Oil & Gas owns an adjacent block
  - Unitizing (combining) the two fields is possible, and talks have begun
  - Negotiations would involve coordination issues
- Competitive, first-mover advantage issue:
  - Kahuna has recently been talking about moving to develop its block soon, and independently of Nash
    - Kahuna would be able to drain some oil from the Nash side of the reservoir, leading to a transfer of about \$150 MM in value from Nash to Kahuna
  - Nash could be similarly motivated; could drain \$50 MM in value from Kahuna's side of the reservoir

## Game theory is the most appropriate tool when the issues lie within the 3C space



## Game theory is in the same family as DA, but differs in subtle yet important ways


### **Game vs. Decision Trees**

- Game trees model the actions of other players as decisions, not uncertainties
- Each player's decisions are a function of others' decisions and their own payoffs (value)
- Chance events can be incorporated as in decision trees

### **Economic Modeling**

- Similar to DA, but done from each player's perspective
- Decision switches in the model are for all key players

### The game tree for this case



### Game theory shows:

- Kahuna will always have an incentive to develop now
- The expected value of drilling for Nash is 225 (.25\*600 + .75\*100), clearly **less** than the 300 from not drilling
- Contrary to the DA, Nash should <u>not</u> drill the second exploratory well
- The first-mover advantage means the information has negative value

## There may also be signaling issues in games

- Information may become known to other players, who can then use that information to their advantage
- In this case, Kahuna would surely discover something about the results of a second exploratory well
  - If the well is a success, Nash would surely trumpet the results
  - If it fails, Nash would say little, if anything; this silence would be a clear signal to Kahuna

## One also needs to consider whether information can bolster a negotiating position

- For example, if Nash and Kahuna are negotiating unitization, will the information improve the chance of achieving a win-win?
- With a positive test result, Nash may feel it is fair to demand a predominant share of the unitization equity split
  - May be more "fair," but fairness is beside the point
  - The prospect of such a demand may give Kahuna more reason to develop its own block separately and quickly
- A second exploratory well may not bolster Nash's negotiating position and, in fact, may ensure that Nash is a disadvantaged second-mover (illustrated on next slide)

Why information-seeking does not add value to these negotiations Nash Kahuna Success 600 350 Develop now .25 <u>Failure</u> 100 350 .75 Kahuna Accept 285 665 Offer to unitize **Drill Second** 70-30 Reject 200 750 Exploratory. Well Nash Accept 475 475 **Success** Kahuna Offer to unitize .25 50-50 Reject 750 200 Develop later Not Wait 200 Nash Accept 225 225 Offer to unitize Nash 50-50 Reject Failure 200 250 .75 Develop later Not 200 Kahuna Accept 250 250 Offer to unitize Reject/(both) develop now Nash 50-50 Not 200 300 Develop now i **Develop Now** 200

Whether drill or not, there is no unitization win-win. Kahuna will still have an incentive to develop now. In turn, so should Nash.

## Summary and points to take with you

- Using a DA framework to calculate VOI and assess its strategic implications can be dangerously misleading
  - Game situations can make VOI negative due to issues around timing and signaling
  - A DA approach to VOI can also blind us to negotiation realities
- In framing, structuring and evaluating a VOI question, as well as many strategy issues, analysts thus need to pay heed to interactions
  - If 3C issues exist, a game-theoretic analysis is usually more appropriate than DA
  - Game theory should be seen as an extension of DA